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Abstract
The matching method for treatment evaluation does not balance selective unobserved
dierences between treated and non-treated. We derive a simple correction term if
there is an instrument that shifts the treatment probability to zero in specic cases.
Policies with eligibility restrictions, where treatment is impossible if some variable
exceeds a certain value, provide a natural application. In an empirical analysis, we
exploit the age eligibility restriction in the Swedish Youth Practice subsidized work
program for young unemployed, where compliance is imperfect among the young.
Adjusting the matching estimator for selectivity changes the results towards making
subsidized work detrimental in moving individuals into employment. We also consider
the eligibility change induced by the introduction of the program.
2
1 Introduction
The matching method for treatment evaluation compares outcomes of treated and non-
treated subjects, conditioning on observed individual and environment characteristics. Ba-
sically, the average treatment eect on the treated (ATT) is estimated by averaging ob-
served outcome dierences over the treated. The main assumption is that the conditioning
ensures that the assigned treatment status is conditionally mean independent from the
potential outcomes (this is usually known as \the Conditional Independence Assumption"
or, in short, CIA, although in fact it concerns mean independence).1
The method is intuitive, as it mimics randomized experiments: the distributions of
behavioral determinants and indicators are balanced as closely as possible over treated
and non-treated, using observational data. The use of the method has improved the policy
evaluation practice by clarifying the importance of common support restrictions for the
distribution of conditioning variables. By now, it is a common tool for the analysis of active
labor market policies (ALMP) and programs (see e.g. the survey in Kluve, 2006). However,
matching has the well-recognized limitation that it does not ensure the balancing of the
distribution of unobservable determinants of both treatment assignment and outcomes
among treated and non-treated. When incapable to balance unobservables, matching may
produce biased estimates of the treatment eects.
The rst contribution of this paper deals with this problem by developing an estimation
method for the average treatment on the treated that is robust to violations in the condi-
tional independence assumption justifying matching. The idea is to correct the matching
estimate with a measure of the bias due to selection on unobservables. Key to the estimation
of such correction term is the availability of an instrument capable of driving participation
to zero at certain of its (possibly limiting) values while keeping the selection mechanism
partly unexplained at other parts of its distribution. Like the matching methods, our ap-
1See e.g. Cochrane and Rubin (1973), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), and Heckman, Ichimura, and
Todd (1998).
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proach matches the distribution of observed variables between treated and non-treated
groups, thus eectively combining matching with the exogenous variation provided by an
instrument to balance unobservables.
Alternative approaches in order to correct matching estimators for selection problems
typically assume that the relevant unobserved variables have additive eects on the po-
tential outcomes (see Heckman and Robb, 1985, and Andrews and Schafgans, 1998). The
popular conditional dierence-in-dierences estimator (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and
Todd, 1998) is also based on this. By contrast, our approach does not require additivity.
Within the same framework we also suggest a new test of the CIA. In the presence of
a valid instrument, satisfying the condition introduced above, the CIA holds if and only if
the correction term is zero. Thus, testing the validity of the CIA is equivalent to test the
statistical signicance of the correction term.
The second contribution of this paper is to show that there are important empirical
applications for this method. Consider, for instance, the case of treatment evaluation in
the context of ALMP for unemployed workers. It has been recognized that individual char-
acteristics and employment history may not capture the full range of skills and motivation
that explain both treatment participation and employment-related outcomes.2 However,
many programs use clear eligibility rules based on observed variables and often involving
boundary restrictions. Also, novel programs are introduced and others are terminated, cre-
ating variation in eligibility over calendar time. Eligibility variation can be exploited to
construct an instrument capable of moving subjects in and out of treatment while otherwise
being unrelated to the potential outcome(s) of interest.
The ideal setting for the application of our method is created by non-mandatory pro-
grams in the presence on boundary eligibility restrictions on personal characteristics or
2For example, Card and Sullivan (1988), Gritz (1993), Bonnal, Fougere and Serandon (1997) and
Richardson and Van den Berg (2012) argue that this can be expected to play a major role in the empirical
evaluation of ALMP, and their estimation results conrm this. Van den Berg, Van der Klaauw and Van
Ours (2004) contain similar ndings for the eect of punitive sanctions for welfare recipients.
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time. In such cases, full non-participation is observed at certain values of the instrument
while compliance is imperfect at other values.3 This is a relevant setting for ALMP. It is a
common feature of ALMP to restrict eligibility to individuals aged above or below a certain
age, or to individuals with a certain minimum or maximum amount of education, and/or
to individuals with a certain minimum amount of labor market experience (see e.g. Kluve,
2006). The latter includes eligibility based on proling systems that determine potential
treatments as a deterministic function of a set of individual characteristics. Many policies
only apply to certain regions, cantons or states, and as noted above, the introduction and
abolition of policies leads to eligibility changes as well. (In Section 3 of the paper we give
concrete examples of studies that exploit eligibility variation in instrumental variable set-
tings.) In many of these cases, compliance among the eligible individuals is imperfect, and
actual participation is selective. Individuals may inuence participation, or the case worker
may use her discretionary power to assign individuals based on individual characteristics
that are unobserved to the researcher. The same problems arise with random experiments
if compliance to the treatment is imperfect. In all these cases, the matching approach can
not be used. We propose overcoming this limitation by exploiting the eligibility boundary
restriction within the matching framework.
Our approach is related to Battistin and Rettore (2008), who consider a specic par-
tially fuzzy discontinuity design where eligibility rules preclude participation on one side of
a threshold for a certain variable and allow - but do not impose - it on the opposite side (so
non-compliance aects outcomes on one side of the threshold). To identify a Local Average
Treatment Eect (LATE), they need the continuity assumption that is characteristic of
sharp regression discontinuity (RD) designs. They note the similarities with the \Bloom
3Here, the word \compliance" is used in a statistical sense, meaning that some of the individuals who,
according to the policy design, are eligible for treatment end up in the non-treated subpopulation.
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setting": a fully experimental setting with non-compliance on the treated side only.4 We
derive a similar estimator, but our derivations are from a matching perspective, and, ac-
cordingly, our quantity of interest is the average treatment eect on the treated (ATT). The
underlying assumptions are not identical and, as a result, the applicability also diers. In
Section 2 we discuss general dierences between our approach and the LATE estimator of
Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996), and we consider other
combinations of matching and instrumental variable estimation, notably the approach of
Baiocchi et al. (2010). Both our estimator and the Battistin and Rettore (2008) estimator
lead to a test of the CIA. When deriving our proposed testing procedure (Subsection 2.2)
we point out in what sense they dier. Our empirical application (Section 3) illustrates
how our approach can be applied in a case where the RD approach is not appropriate.
We empirically assess our approach by evaluating a major Swedish program aimed at
helping young unemployed individuals to nd work, the Youth Practice (YP).5 YP is a
subsidized work program designed for short-term unemployed individuals aged below 25.
The program is not compulsory. As a result, compliance is imperfect on the lower side
of the age-eligibility threshold. We may therefore apply our selectivity-adjusted matching
estimator using age as the instrument. In Section 3 we argue that the exclusion restriction is
valid. The subpopulation of non-treated includes those below 25 who do not participate as
well as those 25 and above. Participation is not sharply discontinuous at age 25 but declines
gradually before age 25. This is not a problem for our method but could complicate the
application of regression-discontinuity methods. The non-compulsory nature of the program
among eligibles may raise diculties for matching to balance unobservables. We use our
4The idea of exploiting one-sided compliance to deal with selective participation has some history in
the analysis of treatment eects on duration outcomes in Mixed Proportional Hazard types of models with
endogenous treatments. See Bijwaard and Ridder (2005) and Abbring and Van den Berg (2005).
5There is an increasing awareness that youth unemployment may be a serious problem for society despite
the fact that youth unemployment durations are relatively short. This is because of the prevalence of
psychological and labor-market scarring eects which may have long-run implications for the productivity
of those aected (see e.g. Burgess et al., 2003).
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correction factor to assess whether this is in fact the case and to eliminate the potential
selection bias.
YP was introduced in July 1992. Availability of data prior to its introduction allows
us to examine an alternative instrumental variable, based on calendar time. In this case,
the subpopulation of non-treated includes individuals in the age eligibility group (below
25) who either opt out of YP or ow into unemployment some time before YP becomes
available. Using time variation as the instrument, we re-estimate the eect of the treatment
and we assess the validity of the CIA.
The Swedish YP has been evaluated before (see e.g. White and Knight, 2002, Larsson,
2003, Forslund and Nordstrom Skans, 2006, for results). It is of particular interest that
existing YP evaluations are based on the matching approach. We nd that adjusting the
matching estimator for selectivity changes the results to become negative when the outcome
of interest is outow into employment.
In Section 2 we develop a formal framework for the analysis. We dene the objects of
interest and we derive the selectivity-adjusted matching estimator. In Section 3 we discuss
the Swedish YP program, estimation details, data and estimates. Section 4 concludes.
2 A correction term to matching
2.1 Identication of the ATT in case of selective participation
and ineligibles
In what follows, we adopt standard counterfactual notation where Y0 and Y1 are individual
potential outcomes associated with being assigned to non-treatment and treatment, re-
spectively. The binary indicator, D, denotes the actual treatment status, where we use the
terms \participation" and \treatment" to denote D = 1 and \non-participation" and \con-
trol" to denote D = 0. The nite-dimensional vector X contains conditioning variables.
The actual outcome Y satises Y = DY1 + (1 D)Y0.
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We are interested in the Average Treatment Eect on the Treated (ATT):
ATT = E[Y1   Y0 j D = 1]:
Clearly,
ATT = EXjD=1E[Y1   Y0 j X;D = 1] = (1)
EXjD=1E[Y1 j X;D = 1]  EXjD=1E[Y0 j X;D = 1]
where the expectations EXjD=1 are taken over the distribution of X among the treated.
Under the unconfoundedness assumption or Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA)
stating that Y0 ? D j X, the ATT is identied and can be estimated using a matching
method. We do not make such an assumption because we do not rule out that, conditional
on observed confounders X, the actual treatment assignment is related to the individual
potential outcomes. The most obvious reason to expect violation of the CIA is that there
may be individual characteristics that aect both the treatment status and the potential
outcome in case of non-participation in the program, where some of these characteristics
may be unobserved to the researcher. We therefore refer to violation of the CIA as \selection
on unobservables". Instead of adopting the CIA, we assume that there exists a variable Z
with the following two features,
1. Y0 ? Z j X;
2. There exists a set of points fz; zg in the domain of Z where
P [D = 1 j X;Z = z] = 0 and 0 < P [D = 1 j X;Z = z]  1
for all X.
Assumption 1 states that Z does not explain Y0 when conditioning on the explanatory
variables X. It is a common instrumental variables exclusion assumption, but notice that it
is imposed on untreated outcomes only and that it is conditional on observed confounders.
In contrast, the LATE estimator further requires that Z has no impact on treated outcomes
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and is exogenous in the assignment rule (Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Angrist, Imbens and
Rubin, 1996).
Assumption 2 states that D is a non-trivial function of Z after conditioning on X. In
particular, it ensures that participation can be driven to zero at certain parts of the distri-
bution of Z. If the participation probability is zero then we call the individual ineligible.
The assumption is stronger then the corresponding LATE assumptions, which require the
instrument to drive participation (informative), and which rule out \deers" (i.e., which
impose monotonicity).
These assumptions do not rule out that participation is selective. In particular, if
Z = z, then D may depend on Y0 even after conditioning on X. Assumptions 1 and
2 can be called an exclusion restriction and an \informative instrument" assumption, so
it is natural to call Z an instrumental variable. Notice that Assumption 2 can be veried
empirically, whereas Assumption 1 requires an external justication. A common point of
concern for exclusion restrictions like Assumption 1 is that there may be characteristics
that aect both the instrument Z and the potential outcome Y0, where these characteristics
may be unobserved to the researcher. If the instrument is a threshold value of a personal
characteristic, one needs to address whether the threshold may represent additional dif-
ferences between the set of agents on one side of the threshold and the set of agents on
the other side. For example, the threshold may be indicative of a stratication of the la-
bor market. Another concern with exclusion restrictions is that individuals may act upon
knowledge of their personal value of Z before the treatment status is determined, and this
behavior may aect the potential outcomes, leading to a violation of the restriction (Van
den Berg, 2007). In Section 3 we discuss the justication of Assumption 2 in our empirical
application and in similar potential applications.
Identication of the ATT also hinges on standard assumptions like SUTVA (Stable
Unit Treatment Value Assumption) and common support. SUTVA requires the potential
outcomes of each individual i to be invariant to the assignment of treatment in the rest
of the population (Rubin, 1980 and 1990). Under SUTVA there is no interference between
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units or individuals in the population. It eectively rules out eects of treatment arising
through market adjustment mechanisms or social interactions.
To discuss the common support assumption, let us dene P (X) and P (X) as the
density functions of X on the sub-populations of ineligibles (D = 0; Z = z) and untreated
eligibles (D = 0; Z = z), respectively. The common support assumption can be stated as
0 < P (X) and 0 < P (X) for all X 2 Supp(XjD = 1)
where Supp(XjD = 1) is the domain of covariates X among the treated. Empirical ap-
plications of matching explicitly impose an overlapping support condition, thus excluding
non-overlapping regions. In the latter case, our proposed method will identify the average
impact of treatment on treated represented among both non-treated and ineligibles. This
follows standard matching results.
In expression (1) for ATT, the term EXjD=1E[Y1 j X;D = 1] is directly identied from
the mean observed outcome among the treated. The challenge is to identify the mean
counterfactual outcome, EXjD=1E[Y0 j X;D = 1].
Under Assumption 1,
E [Y0 j X] = E [Y0 j X;Z]
= E [Y0 j X;Z;D = 0]P [D = 0 j X;Z] + (2)
E [Y0 j X;Z;D = 1]P [D = 1 j X;Z] :
Since this relationship holds for all possible values of Z, and in particular for Z = z,
Assumption 2 ensures that
E [Y0 j X] = E [Y0 j X;Z = z; D = 0] : (3)
On the other hand, the following decomposition always yields,
E [Y0 j X] = E [Y0 j X;D = 0]P [D = 0 j X] +
E [Y0 j X;D = 1]P [D = 1 j X]
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implying
E [Y0 j X;D = 1]
=
E [Y0 j X]  E [Y0 j X;D = 0]P [D = 0 j X]
P [D = 1 j X]
=
E [Y0 j X;Z = z; D = 0]  E [Y0 j X;D = 0]P [D = 0 j X]
P [D = 1 j X]
= E [Y0 j X;D = 0] + E [Y0 j X;Z = z
; D = 0]  E [Y0 j X;D = 0]
1  P [D = 0 j X] : (4)
Equation (4) is an expression for the mean counterfactual outcome E[Y0 j X;D = 1]
given X. The mean counterfactual outcome given X that is used in standard matching
estimation, E [Y0 j X;D = 0], is corrected for individual selection on unobservables by the
second term in line four of the equation.
The terms E [Y0 j X;D = 0] and E[Y0 j X;Z = z; D = 0] in the right-hand side of
equation (4) are identied from the mean observed outcome among the controls at given
X and the mean observed outcome among the ineligible controls at given X, respectively.
Taken together, this implies that the mean counterfactual outcome E[Y0 j X;D = 1] given
X is identied from equation (4). In turn, by the law of iterated expectations, the mean
counterfactual outcome EXjD=1E[Y0 j X;D = 1] unconditional on X is identied by averag-
ing over the observable distribution of X given D = 1. Hence, the ATT is identied. Notice
that identication does not require any additivity assumption on the relationships between
outcome, treatment, and instrument. Also, identication does not require the instrument
to be discrete or to be continuous. In the next subsection we discuss, in some detail, the
implementation of the estimator suggested by the above constructive identication proof.
An alternative but similar approach to identication and inference is based on the fact
that, in the absence of selection on unobservables, we can discard the ineligibles and instead
use only the eligible controls to obtain the mean counterfactual outcome for the treated.
In general, we can express the ATT as
ATT = E[X;Z=zjD=1] E[Y1   Y0 j X;Z = z; D = 1]
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where z stands for all possible values of z satisfying Assumption 2. This expression for
the ATT follows from the fact that D = 1 automatically implies that Z = z for some z
satisfying Assumption 2. We will now follow the above derivation of the identication of
E[Y0 j X;D = 1], where we now condition on Z = z as well as on X.
The mean no-treatment outcome at a specic point (X;Z = z) with a non-zero prob-
ability of treatment is
E [Y0 j X;Z = z] = E [Y0 j X;Z = z; D = 0]P [D = 0 j X;Z = z]
+E [Y0 j X;Z = z; D = 1]P [D = 1 j X;Z = z]
while Assumptions 1 and 2 ensure that
E [Y0 j X;Z = z] = E [Y0 j X;Z = z]
= E [Y0 j X;Z = z; D = 0] :
But then, the counterpart of (4) if conditioning on Z is
E [Y0 j X;Z = z; D = 1]
= E [Y0 j X;Z = z; D = 0] (5)
+
E [Y0 j X;Z = z; D = 0]  E [Y0 j X;Z = z; D = 0]
P [D = 1 j X;Z = z] :
The terms E [Y0 j X;Z = z; D = 0] and E[Y0 j X;Z = z; D = 0] in the right-hand
side of equation (5) are identied from the corresponding observed outcomes. This implies
that the mean counterfactual outcome E[Y0 j X;Z = z; D = 1] at given X and Z = z is
identied from equation (5). In turn, the mean counterfactual outcome EX;Z=zjD=1E[Y0 j
X;Z = z; D = 1] unconditional on X and Z is identied by averaging over the observable
distribution ofX;Z givenD = 1. Again, the ATT follows. Notice that if there is no selection
on unobservables then the correction term in (5) vanishes, so only controls used to estimate
the ATT are the non-treated eligibles. In this sense, the alternative approach subsumes the
instrument Z in the set of conditioning variables X.6 With selection on unobservables, of
6See Heckman and Lozano (2004) for a discussion of the selection of covariates in matching.
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course, the ineligible controls with Z = z are also used in the alternative approach to
obtain the correction term.
Although we rely on an instrumental variable to correct matching from selection on
unobservables, our approach can still recover the ATT. This is in contrast to the approach in
the LATE literature initiated by Imbens and Angrist (1994), which imposes a monotonicity
assumption to determine the impact of treatment on \compliers" (see also Angrist, Imbens
and Rubin, 1996). Instead, we rely on the alternative premise that the instrument can drive
participation in a program to zero. By ruling out the existence of \deers" and \always-
takers" and by making all treated \compliers", our assumption is stronger than (and thus
implies) the LATE monotonicity assumption. However, as we have seen, it allows us to
relax LATE independence assumptions on the treated outcomes and participation rule.
Similarly, our exclusion restriction (Assumption 1) implies Battistin and Rettore (2008)'s
continuity assumption around the threshold point. At the same time, we avoid the local
discontinuity in participation that they use for identication and for their LATE estimator.
Baiocchi et al. (2010) develop a treatment evaluation estimator that also combines
matching and instrumental variables. Their setting is more closely related to the LATE
setting than to our setting. Indeed, it specializes to a LATE setting under the usual LATE
interpretation and assumptions. In the rst stage of their estimation procedure, they match
individuals with low values of the instrumental variable to individuals with high values.
Subsequently, they examine the eect of the instrument on the treatment and the eect
of the instrument on the outcome. Combining this results in an estimator that can be
interpreted as a LATE estimator. As in our case, controlling for covariates makes it less
likely that the exclusion restriction is violated by common unobserved determinants of the
instrument and the potential outcomes.
13
2.2 Inference
Our estimation method for the ATT closely follows the above identication proofs. For the
sake of brevity we focus on the method for the rst approach discussed above, where we use
equation (4) to obtain the mean counterfactual outcome among the treated E(Y0 j D = 1).
Equation (4) is conditional on X and D = 0, but we need to average it over the observable
distribution of X given D = 1 to obtain E(Y0 j D = 1). For this purpose we estimate a
propensity score for P(D = 1 j X), using the full sample. Next, we match each treated
individual to non-treated individuals, using propensity-score kernel-matching. However,
contrary to the standard matching approach to treatment evaluation, we do not take the
dierence of the outcome of the treated and the matched (weighted mean) outcome of
the controls, but we take the dierence of the outcome of the treated and the matched
(weighted mean) value of the right-hand side of equation (4). In the right-hand side, the
separate terms are kernel-smoothed for this purpose, using propensity scores as well. Notice
that in the alternative approach based on equation (5), the main propensity score does not
only depend on X but also on Z for values Z = z.7 In Subsection 3.4 we discuss practical
implementation issues for our estimator, in the context of the evaluation of the Swedish
Youth Practice (YP) program.
The standard errors are estimated with bootstrapping. Each replication samples from
the original data, before matching is performed, and replicates the whole estimation rou-
tine. This procedure accounts for all steps in estimation, including estimation of the propen-
sity score. Standard errors are computed directly on each of the estimated parameters, not
as a combination standard errors of dierent terms that may form the ATT.8 Because the
7The ATT estimates suggested by the two alternative approaches are not necessarily identical. This
provides scope for the construction of a general specication test. However, it remains to be seen whether
such a test has satisfactory power, as the underlying estimates are driven by outcomes from overlapping
subsamples.
8This is important as various terms, such as the standard matching estimate and the correction terms,
may be correlated.
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number of matches increases with sample size and the estimator is asymptotically linear
as shown in Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998), bootstrapping is expected to provide
correct inference when applied to kernel matching (this is at odds with the results for
nearest neighbor matching derived in Abadie and Imbens, 2008). It is also much simpler to
implement than the asymptotic variance derived in Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998).
Under Assumptions 1 and 2 (together with common support and SUTVA), the estima-
tors implied by (4) and (5) are equally consistent for ATT. However, when the population
of ineligibles is comparatively large, the denominator in (4) may become excessively small
and lead to imprecise estimates of the correction term. This is similar to the classical
weak instruments problem. In the context of our estimator, it can be tackled by comparing
treated with other eligibles only as in equation (5) if the sizes of treated and non-treated
groups among eligibles are comparable.
We may also use the results of the previous subsection to design tests of the usual CIA
assumption that Y0 ? D j X, provided that Assumptions 1 and 2 apply. The standard
matching method assumes CIA, which implies that the rst term of the right-hand side of
(4) captures E (Y0jX;D = 1). As already pointed out, the second term can be labelled a
correction term due to selection on unobservables. Thus, the usual CIA assumption holds
i the correction term is zero for any possible X, so i
E [Y0 j X;Z = z; D = 0] = E [Y0 j X;D = 0] (6)
for any X. In the alternative approach (see (5)), this is replaced by
E [Y0 j X;Z = z; D = 0] = E [Y0 j X;Z = z; D = 0] : (7)
for any possible X and z. This can again be aggregated over X and z. These equalities
can be used to test the usual CIA assumption in standard matching estimation. Alter-
natively, we may test directly whether the correction terms are zero, because these are a
by-product of the ATT estimation.
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Battistin and Rettore (2008) propose a selection test based on the bias term
E [Y0 j X;Z;D = 0]  E [Y0 j X;Z;D = 1] (8)
dened in regions of Z where participation is not deterministic. Under their RD design
with one-sided imperfect compliance, the bias term in (8) can be computed at the eligibility
cuto point. The statistical signicance of this term at that specic point provides some
information of what may happen elsewhere. In contrast, the matching setup that we explore
allows us to directly test the CIA on a larger part of the domain of Z, and therefore
on a larger population. This is not empirically irrelevant as sample sizes often preclude
meaningful analysis in local discontinuity estimation.
3 Empirical Application: Evaluating Youth Practice
We study the impact of a Swedish youth employment program, the Youth Practice (YP),
on the employment probability of young men. The aim of this program is to ease the
ow of young unemployed into work by providing work experience. The main focus of our
evaluation is its impact on transitions into employment. In what follows we discuss the
program, the data, the choice of instruments, the estimation procedure, and the results.
3.1 The program
YP is a Swedish large-scale subsidized-work program targeted at the 18-24 years old un-
employed. It was launched in July 1992, in response to the adverse labor market conditions
of the early 1990s recession in Sweden. In October 1995 it was subsumed into an extended
policy program for youth unemployment.
The YP program was primarily intended for unemployed individuals with a high school
diploma. Ocially, two rules determined eligibility: (1) that the individual is aged 18 to
24 at the time of enrollment into YP, and (2) that prior to enrollment she/he has been
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registered with the employment oce for a minimum duration of 4 months for the 20-
24 years old and 8 weeks for the 18-19 years old. Empirical data show that the second
eligibility requirement was not respected: almost 20 percent of 20-24 years old participants
enter YP within 1 month of registering, and over 60 percent enter before completing the
rst 4 months. In contrast, the age eligibility rule is strictly respected: participants are
always 24 or younger at the moment of enrolling into YP.
The treatment consisted of a job placement in the private or public sector for 6 months
with a possible extension to 12 months. While at work, YP participants received an al-
lowance below the current wage rate. The employer paid at most a small fraction of the
allowance. The job was supposed to be supplementary, in the sense that it should not
displace regular employment, and to include a mixture of work and training leading to hu-
man capital accumulation. In addition to work, participants were also expected to spend
four to eight hours per week actively seeking regular employment at the employment of-
ce. In practice, however, the latter guidelines may not have been strictly adhered to.
No-displacement and job-search guidelines seem to have been ignored regularly. Most job
search requirements were simple, and the proportion of time in training was negligible (see
Larsson, 2003, and references therein).
Participation was not compulsory. YP was one among several non-compulsory treat-
ments that agents could enter. Notably, agents could try to participate in Labor Market
Training. This is an expensive program that mostly consists of vocational training. How-
ever, this program was primarily intended for displaced workers in need of a new type of
occupation (Richardson and Van den Berg, 2012). Indeed, YP was by far the most common
treatment among young unemployed individuals. In over 22% of the new registration spells
of eligible individuals aged 20 to 24 during the YP period, YP is the rst reported event
after registration at the employment oce, whereas the other possible treatments amount
to only 16%, of which just over a third concerns Labor Market Training.9
9We consider exits from the rst unemployment period after registration with the employment oce.
The reported gures refer to individuals aged 20 to 24 when rst registering with the employment oce
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Assignment to YP follows a complex selection mechanism. Similarly to all alternative
treatments oered by the Swedish employment oces at the time, assignment to YP was
decided in mutual agreement between the unemployed and the employment ocer. Ac-
cording to the accounts of job seekers and employment ocers alike, YP was generally
regarded as providing real work experience (see Larsson, 2003, Forslund and Nordstrom
Skans,2006). Moreover, candidates interested in YP were encouraged to nd a placement
on their own to build initiative, job search and representation skills. Together, these two
conditions support the view that participants may have been better equipped to nd a
job than non-participants. In some occasions, however, employment ocers oered YP
placements to job seekers. The allocation of such treatments may be driven by ocers
prioritizing candidates in special need of help or close to benets eligibility exhaustion.
Both processes challenge the ability of matching to deal eectively with selection. Our
proposed method can be used to assess the presence of residual selection after matching
and to correct it when a valid instrument is available.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Register and sample
We use the Swedish unemployment register called Handel. This is an administrative dataset
that comprises information from August 1991 onwards on registration spells with the em-
ployment oces, labor market status of registered individuals (individuals in low-paid
jobs may register), program participation and the subsequent labor market status of those
who deregister (e.g. employment, education or inactivity). All individuals with registra-
tion spells since 1991 are included in the dataset and their registration and unemployment
history can be followed over time. Handel also includes demographic information on age,
gender, citizenship, area of residence and education.
The Handel dataset required considerable cleaning and selection work, mainly due to
between July 1992 and September 1994.
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the high incidence of negative and overlapping spells. The criteria applied to construct the
nal dataset are described in the appendix.
We select observations for young men to estimate the impact of treatment on individuals
aged 20 to 24 when rst registering with the employment oce between August 1991 and
September 1994 (or some subgroup thereof). Men aged 18-19 at registration are excluded
due to a range of dierences with the policy regime for those below 20 (see Forslund and
Nordstrom Skans, 2006, and the other references in Section 1, for details on YP and youth
unemployment in Sweden). Observations for older men (age 25 to 29) or men registering
prior to the onset of YP are used to construct control groups. Estimation relies on either all
new registration spells, independently of the employment status of the new applicant, or
the subsample of new registration spells classied as open unemployment for comparison
purposes.10 We consider a single registration spell per individual during the period of
interest, namely the earliest one. Registration spells starting after September 1994 are
disregarded, as YP take-up slowed substantially from then onwards until extinction in
October 1995.11
Two sources of variation will be explored to dene our instruments, age and calendar
time. Depending on the instrument, data will be sliced in dierent ways. More details on
the construction of treatment and comparison groups, sample sizes and properties, together
with the instruments can be found below (see sections 3.5 and 3.6 for results on age and
calendar time, respectively).
3.2.2 Eligibility status, treatment status, and outcomes of interest
We aim to measure the impact of YP on subsequent individual labor market outcomes.
The potential participants, or eligibles, are men starting a new registration spell with the
10Employed individuals looking for a new job may register with the employment oce; they account for
less than 4% of all new spells for the population we are considering.
11Among eligibles, YP occurred in only 3% of registration spells starting after September 1994 and under
1% of registration spells starting after January 1995.
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employment oce between July 1992 and September 1994 while aged 20 to 24. In contrast,
ineligibles are men who either start a new registration spell when aged 25 or above or prior
to the onset of YP in July 1992. Treatment is dened as enrolling into YP as the rst
destination after registration, if enrollment occurs during the rst 3 or during the rst 6
months of the spell (we dene \time to treatment" to be the duration of the registration
spell before the enrollment in YP). Obviously, enrollment is only possible for eligibles. The
alternative sample of non-eligibles having registered before July 1992 is restricted to those
who owed in suciently early to experience all their time to potential treatment before
the introduction of YP.
Dynamic selection12 is beyond the scope of our study. Thus, our denition of treatment
status is unconditional on time to treatment other than through the time window require-
ment described above. Likewise, non-treated eligibles and non-eligibles are not selected
on time in unemployment before moving into some alternative treatment or deregistering.
The severity of any resulting bias from disregarding time to treatment will depend on the
time window allowed before enrollment. We consider only relatively short durations prior
to enrollment into treatment, of up to 3 or 6 months, and compare results to assess the im-
portance of our choices.13 By excluding YP participants enrolling later in their registration
spell, we eliminate selection due to the imminent exhaustion of entitlement to unemploy-
ment benets (which occurs after 14 months in the claiming count). We notice that the
treated, or participants, do move quickly into YP after registration, with just under 50%
and 83% doing so during the rst 3 and 6 months of the new spell, respectively.
To assess the impact of enrolling into YP, we measure employment status after registra-
tion. The discussion below focuses on the take-up of regular employment, or, alternatively,
12Controlling for the duration of unemployment prior to enrollment into treatment would call for a
dynamic framework, which has problems of its own, in particular since we do not rule out that there is
selection on unobservables; see Abbring and Van den Berg (2003, 2005). See Fredriksson and Johansson
(2008) and Crepon et al. (2009), for the use of matching methods that deal explicitly with dynamic
enrollment.
13Sample sizes become forbiddingly small when further tightening the enrollment window.
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on having deregistered to move to any destination, after 12 or after 24 months of registra-
tion.14
3.3 Instrumental variables
For the purpose of illustrating the empirical relevance our method, we consider two alter-
native instruments. The rst is age. It explores the clear cuto point in eligibility at the
moment the individual turns 25, by comparing individuals at each side of the threshold.
The second is time and explores the introduction of YP in July 1992 to compare individuals
under dierent policy regimes.
When using age, the exclusion restriction entails that the potential outcome in case
of non-treatment should not systematically depend on whether the individual is above or
below 25 years old at the moment at which the treatment status is realized, conditional on
X. We provide some arguments in support of this. First, notice that although employers
may nd it relevant whether an applicant for a regular job is above or below 25 years old,
they are less likely to be interested in whether the individual was above or below 25 at the
time of potential enrollment into YP. As we shall see, we use samples with rather narrow
age intervals around 25, so at the time at which the outcomes are realized, many treated
individuals are older than 25. Notice also that individuals who are aged around 25 and
who enter unemployment often have a relatively low level of education. Such individuals
have not yet achieved a high degree of specialized work experience. Hence, their baseline
position in the job market is not likely to be strongly dependent on the exact age within the
age interval we consider. More in general, the age range within which individuals compete
with each other in the job market is probably broader than just a few years.
The use of age eligibility thesholds as instrumental variables is widespread in the em-
pirical evaluation literature. For example, Angrist and Krueger (1991) use age eligibility
14Since we do not follow individuals throughout their out-of-the-registar periods, all we know is their
destination upon leaving. When considering the employment status, we implicitly assume it has not changed
after registration.
21
thresholds for compulsory schooling to estimate the impact of education on earnings, while
Gelbach (2002) uses it to estimate the impact of children's enrollment in public education
on mother's labor supply. Stancanelli and Van Soest (2011) use retirement age thresholds
to study the eect of the partner's retirement on home production. Dickens, Riley and
Wilkinson (2010), Olssen (2011) and others use age discontinuities of mandatory minimum
wages to study eects of youth minimum wages on individual labor market outcomes. Cal-
endar time thresholds (usually involving the introduction of a new policy) are also widely
used as instrumental variables in evaluation studies. Examples are Blundell et al. (2004)
and Van den Berg, Bozio and Costa Dias (2010), who use the introduction of a job search
assistance program to study participation eects on individual labor market outcomes.
In our setting, the age threshold is our preferred instrument, for two main reasons. First,
it allows for a richer set of covariates to be used in matching. Specically, the use of calendar
time forces the exclusion of past (un)employment history from the set of conditioning
variables given the coincidental shortly distanced starting dates for data coverage and
YP.15 And second, estimates relying on age comparisons are less vulnerable to changing
macro-economic conditions than estimates obtained from comparisons over time. YP was
introduced at a dicult time in Sweden, when the national product was contracting and
employment prospects were deteriorating. These adverse conditions could, conceivably, bias
results relying on time comparisons. In particular, we show that the validity of Assumption
1 is not as clearly established when the instrument is calendar time. Notice that in the
presence of heterogeneity in the impact of treatment, the two instruments may identify
dierent parameters as they implicitly dene dierent subsamples of treated. Yet, and
despite the specic drawbacks of calendar time as instrument, the results are fairly aligned
to those obtained when using age.
15The use of variables describing past (un)employment history in matching is widely regarded as good
practice in labor economics as these are possibly the best conveyors of information on unobserved ability
and preferences for work (see Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997).
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3.4 Estimation procedure
Irrespective of the instrument being used, the application of our method requires two
control groups to be dened. When the counterfactual of interest is as described in equation
(4), the rst control group is the standard matching one. It is drawn from the population of
non-participants (D = 0) to reproduce the distribution of the matching variables X among
the treated. Since the instrument Z is not inX, non-participants comprise both non-eligible
individuals (Z = z, for whom D = 0 always) and eligible individuals that opted out of
YP as their rst activity after registration within the considered unemployment duration
(Z = z; D = 0). The second control group is required to compute the correction term
and draws exclusively from the population of ineligibles (Z = z), again reproducing the
distribution of the matching variables X among the treated.
The alternative estimator described in equation (5) includes the instrument in the set
of matching variables when computing the standard matching counterfactual. In this case,
the rst control group is that of eligible non-participants (Z = z; D = 0) and is drawn
exclusively from the population of eligibles who did not enroll in YP as their rst activity
shortly after registration. The second control group is as dened above.
Estimation uses propensity score matching with Epanechnikov kernel weights. The
propensity score is estimated on all observable characteristics apart from the instrumental
variable, namely citizenship, education and region of residence. When using age as the
instrument, quarter of entry and labor market history during the year preceding the start
of the unemployment spell are also controlled for. If using calendar time, month of entry is
included. Moreover, the instrument Z (either age in years or period of enrollment - before
or after the introduction of YP) is included in the conditioning set to estimate the standard
matching counterfactual using the estimator in equation (5). Matching is performed with
replacement in all cases, so each observation in the control group can be used to match
multiple treated observations. The choice of bandwidth is based on a global cross-validation
exercise. All standard errors are bootstrapped using 200 replications.
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In what follows we discuss the estimation details and results for each instrument sepa-
rately.
3.5 Empirical analysis with instrument 1: age
3.5.1 Descriptives
Age is our preferred instrument. For ease of exposition, we summarize the empirical setting.
We explore the cuto point in eligibility at the 25th birthday and consider the instrument Z
to be 0 or 1 depending on whether the individual is past his 25th birthday at registration or
not, respectively. The analysis is restricted to men starting a new registration spell during
the strong YP period, from its inception in July 1992 to the start of its phasing down period
in September 1994. Only one registration spell is considered for each individual, the rst to
be observed starting on or after July 1992. So eligibles are men registering for the rst time
with the employment oce during the observation window of July 1992 to September 1994
while aged 24 or younger. For them, Z is 1. Non-eligibles are men registering for the rst
time with the employment oce during the observation window of July 1992 to September
1994 while aged 25 or older. For them, Z is 0.
The treated group is composed of eligibles who select into YP as their rst activity after
registering. We consider alternative treatment groups depending on two dimensions:
1. duration of registration spell prior to enrollment into the YP: up to 3 and 6 months;
2. and distance in days to 25th birthday at registration - up to 6 months, 1 year and 2
years. We decided not to tighten this requirement given the small number of treated
observations close to the age cuto point.16
16We also estimated the impact of treatment on the sample of individuals as far as 5 years away from
their 25th birthday but the ensuing increase in the sample size causes the procedure to become forbiddingly
slow when it comes to estimate the precision of the eect. It is also conceivable that our exclusion restriction
does not hold for very wide age groups.
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Table 1 reports sample sizes by eligibility and participation status for dierent age
groups. Participants are individuals moving into YP as the rst activity after registration,
irrespective of time to treatment. Column 3 shows that the number of program participants
increases more than proportionally with distance to 25th birthday. Among individuals
within 3 months of turning 25 at registration, only 81, or 1.5% of the eligibles in this
group, become participants; this proportion rises to 24.5% among eligibles within 5 years
of their 25th birthday. This happens despite the whole population of treated being used
and despite the comparatively high take-up rate among eligibles. The explanation may
be a mechanical assignment issue. Although YP is the most popular treatment among
young individuals in the registrar, eligibles at the verge of completing 25 years of age at
inow have a short time to enroll into the program. On the contrary, younger agents have
comparatively more time, and therefore better chances, to be allocated a place.
This variation in participation rates by age is shown in gure 1. It displays the rate of
transition into YP by time since registration among individuals aged 24 at the moment
they register and depending on whether they are at more (red curve) or less (green curve)
than 4 months from completing 25 years of age. The gure shows that participation rates
for the youngest cohort is steadily above zero straight from inow, peaks at 4 months and
starts declining after that. It also provides further detail to the pattern described in table
1, showing that the older cohort participation is concentrated over the rst months in
unemployment and is never as high as for younger cohorts. As a result, the overall hazard
rates are much lower for the whole population of 24 years old at inow (blue curve) than
among those younger than 4 months from completing 25 years of age.
This pattern of participation by age creates a gradual decline in participation rates with
age at inow. Figure 2 depicts it. There is no visible discontinuity to be explored. This is
not an ideal empirical setting for an application of regression discontinuity. It may also raise
concerns that the selection process depends on distance to 25th birthday at registration.
In the empirical analysis below we show that our identication assumptions hold and that
the estimated eects of YP are robust to changes in the considered age interval and to the
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exclusion of individuals close to the age cuto point.
3.5.2 Common support
Recovering the ATT and testing the CIA requires the support of X among the treated
to be represented among non-treated (D = 0) and non-eligibles (Z = z). If such an
extended common support assumption does not hold, the identied eects will represent
the treatment eects in the overlapping support region only. To empirically check the
common support assumption, gure 3 plots the distribution of the predicted propensity
scores by treatment and eligibility status when age is excluded from the covariates set.
The population being depicted is that of 24 and 25 years old at registration with the
employment oce, where treated are individuals moving into YP in the rst 6 months of
the new registration spell.
Enrollment into treatment seems to be partly dependent on the observable character-
istics but the distribution of the propensity score exhibits very little dependence on the
eligibility status. In fact, the covariates are relatively balanced between the treated and
alternative non-treated groups, even before matching, with a maximum bias of 22%. Match-
ing on the propensity score succeeds in improving balancing for all observables, reducing
the bias very substantially in most cases and to a maximum of below 4%.17
Estimation excluded observations lying below the highest 5th percentile and above the
lowest 99th percentile of the distributions of the propensity scores among treated and
comparison groups. This selection procedure restricts attention to the overlapping support
while moving away from the lower part of the distribution of the propensity score. Equation
(4) justies this asymmetric trimming of the distribution as the estimates of the correction
term can be very imprecise for very low values of the propensity score.
17For the discrete dummy covariates, this test ensures almost perfect alignment between treated and
non-treated or non-eligible groups. For continuous covariates, graphical inspection shows that the common
support assumption holds for each of them taken independently and that all the post-matching distributions
are closer to the distributions among treated. Results available from the authors.
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3.5.3 Some empirical evidence concerning Assumption 1 (exclusion restric-
tion)
Conditional on the matching variables, X, Assumption 1 requires age to have no impact on
the untreated outcome. While this is an untestable assumption since only treated outcomes
are observed among the treated, we may use observations for non-eligibles to test whether
this assumption holds in the absence of YP. We explore two alternative comparisons.
The rst uses information on spells starting during August 1991, the earliest data period,
and compares outows into all destinations and regular employment after 10 months of
registration. This is the latest we observe these individuals before YP is introduced and
justies our choice. The second contrasts outows after 12 and 24 months of registration
for older ineligible individuals during the YP period. We compare men close to either
their 26th or 27th birthday. Table 2 shows the results of t-tests for the comparison of
means (columns 1 and 2) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the comparison of the entire
distributions of untreated outcomes.18 All statistics were computed after matching on the
set of characteristics used to estimate the treatment eect.
Overall there is no evidence that Assumption 1 is violated in this application, at least
when considering populations not exposed to the YP. All p-values are above the standard
5% signicance level and most are well above. However, these results do not exclude the
possibility of Assumption 1 being violated once YP is introduced given its age-eligibility
rule that in practice means younger individuals can wait longer before enrolling. We explore
this possibility below with some sensitivity analysis of our results to dierent choices of
comparison groups.
18We omit test results on outows after 12 months of registration as they are qualitatively identical to
the results on outows after 24 months. They can be requested from the authors.
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3.5.4 Results
Our preferred sample comprises males registering with the employment oce within 1 year
of their 25th birthday while YP is operating in full (between July 1992 and September
1994). This sample is large enough to support precise estimates while ensuring that age
dierences between eligibles and ineligibles do not compromise the validity of Assumption
1. Among eligibles at inow, just over 2% (511 observations) ow into YP within 1 month,
5.5% (1,182 observations) within 3 months and almost 9% (1,887 observations) within
6 months of registering with the employment oce. Our main estimates use the latter
group of participants for the sake of sample size. However, we will also present alternative
comparisons using dierent age groups and unemployment durations before enrolling into
YP to ensure our results are not driven by dynamic selection mechanisms related with age.
Table 3 displays the estimates of the ATT on the probability of nding a regular job
within 12 and 24 months of registering with the employment oce.19
Row 1 in the table displays the main set of estimates, based on individuals aged 24
19Estimates for males only. Sample selection criteria varies by row as detailed in row titles. All estimates
based on sample of new registrations with the employment oce. \Treatment" in rows 1 to 5 stands for
owing into YP within 6 months of registering with employment oce as rst destination after registration.
Row 1 compares treated aged 24 at registration with non-treated aged 24 or 25 at registration. Row 2
restricts the sample to those registering as open unemployed. Row 3 restricts the sample of eligibles to
24 years old at more than 4 months from their 25th birthday at registration. Row 4 restricts the control
group in standard matching to the eligibles (aged 24 at registration). Finally, row 5 redenes \treatment"
as owing into YP as rst destination within 3 months of registration and compares treated aged 24 at
inow with non-treated aged 24 or 25. The impact of treatment is estimated on the probability of moving
into employment within 12 months (columns 1 to 3) and 24 months (columns 4 to 6) of registration.
Columns 1 and 4 display standard matching estimates. Columns 2 and 5 display the correction term as
specied in the right-hand side of equation (4) or, for row 4, of equation (5). Columns 3 and 6 display
the corrected matching estimates using the counterfactuals as specied in equation (4) or, for row 4, in
equation (5). The number of observations in column 7 are for the treated group only. Matching on the
propensity score using kernel Epanechnikov weights with a bandwidth of 0.02 for a probability ranging in
the unit interval. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 200 replications in brackets below the estimate.
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and 25 at registration and dening treatment as owing into YP during the rst 6 months
as the rst destination after registration. Standard matching estimates suggest YP has
a null eect on the probability of moving into employment within 12 (column 1) and 24
(column 4) months of registration. The corrected matching estimates corroborate this result
when applied to the 12 months' outcome. However, the gure regarding outows within 24
months of registration is signicantly dierent. The correction term suggests that treated
are not randomly selected once observables have been controlled for. Instead, the treated
seem to be comparatively better positioned to nd a job in the absence of treatment than
similar non-treated. This is in line with the fact that treated are encouraged to nd their
own job positions and that such selection mechanism might dominate in the beginning
of the registration spells. The consequence is the large and signicantly negative eect of
treatment on outows to employment identied by the corrected matching estimator.
To assess the robustness of this result, we tried several alternative comparisons. Some
of the results are displayed in the other rows of Table 3. We restrict the sample to those
registering as open unemployed in row 2. We exclude eligibles at less than 4 months of
completing 25 years of age in row 3 to control for potential bias arising from older indi-
viduals in the eligible group to be rushed into YP while still eligible. And we restrict the
control group in standard matching to be composed only of non-treated eligibles in row
4. All results are consistent with those shown in row 1. Only in row 4 are the corrected
estimates after 24 months of registering not statistically signicant at 5% signicance level,
but the exhibited pattern is similar to all other cases.20
The last row of Table 3 considers treatment to be `starting YP within rst 3 months
after registering'. If dynamic selection issues were important at these relatively short dura-
tions, we would expect the results to show some response to such change in the denition
20We also considered using other groups: restricting the sample to Swedish citizens; focusing on individ-
uals with vocational training only (the largest educational group with registration spells); and including
exits to registered employment as a positive outcome. All results are consistent with those displayed in
Table 3 and are available from the authors under request.
29
of treatment. However, estimates in row 5 are very similar in size and pattern to those
displayed in the other rows of the same table. The robustness of these results suggests our
preferred time window is suciently narrow to keep time of treatment exogenous in this
analysis.
We further investigate the sensitivity of these results to age in Table 4 by varying the
width of the age interval around the 25th birthday at registration. Columns 1 to 3 display
estimates of the eect of YP on the odds of nding a job within 24 months of registration.
For comparison purposes, the rst row repeats the last three columns in the rst row of
Table 3. The following two rows display results for the population of men up to 2 years (row
2) and half year (row 3) away from their 25th birthday at registration. Neither widening
or narrowing the age interval changes the pattern of the results. However, results in row 3
are substantially larger but very imprecisely estimated given the small sample size.
Columns 4 to 6 display results on an alternative outcome, deregistration within 24
months of rst registering. The classical matching estimate for 24-25 years old (row 1,
column 4) suggests a negative overall impact of the program, maybe due to an extended
lock-in eect or to the extension of eligibility to benets as a consequence of treatment take-
up.21 A similar result holds for 23-26 (row 2). In both cases, however, the correction points
to the opposite direction and the resulting eect is found to be positive and statistically
signicant when the larger age group is used (row 2). Again here, sample size precludes a
clear pattern to emerge from the analysis of the narrower age group (row 3).22
Results for both outcomes are considerably stable across age groups. Such lack of vari-
ation is consistent with an homogeneous eect of treatment by age for the interval being
considered.
21The Swedish welfare system provides unemployment insurance for a limited amount of time after a
transition from employment into unemployment. However, this period can be extended by participation in
the programs made available by the employment oces, of which YP is one example. Repeated participation
would, in principle, allow the unemployed to remain out of work and on benets indenitely.
22We have estimated eects on all outows on other samples as in table 3 and applying the alternative
estimator as dened in equation (5). Results are similar to those discussed here.
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Overall, both tables suggest that standard matching may not be identifying the correct
causal eect of interest (i.e., the ATT). Standard-matching results suggest that the program
has no eect on the probability of nding a job and a small negative eect on the overall
odds of leaving unemployment. Correcting for the potential selection bias in matching
changes the picture quite substantially. The program seems to strongly reduce employment
take-up in the medium run, after 24 months of registration. With regard to the overall
impact on the odds of leaving unemployment, our estimation strategy suggests YP has
either a zero or a small positive eect, within the same time frame. Analysis of other
outcomes suggest that the possible positive eect of YP on deregistration is driven by exits
into formal education (these estimates are available under request from the authors).23
3.6 Empirical analysis with instrument 2: calendar time
We explore the introduction of YP in July 1992 and compare pre- and post-YP periods
to construct a new set of estimates of the impact of treatment on the probabilities of
employment and deregistration. To minimize bias from changing macro conditions and
seasonal variation, we select the closest possible periods allowing for the construction of a
non-eligible, pre-YP group over the same calendar months as the post-YP group. Specif-
23Swedish subsidized work programs have been the focus of other studies. In particular, Sianesi (2004)
analyzes the overall impact of the Swedish ALMP system and the dierential impact of each of the
numerous available treatments for adults (so this excludes YP). She nds that subsidized employment
is the best performer in terms of moving unemployed back into work, and that the positive eect of
subsidized employment seems to last. All other programs have either a zero or a negative impact, possibly
arising through the renewed eligibility to benets as a consequence of program participation. Larsson
(2003) studies specically the eects of YP on exits to employment and nds negative eects 12 months
after treatment using standard matching techniques. More generally, youth programs have often shown
disappointing results (see surveys by Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999, and Bergemann and Van den
Berg, 2008). A noticeable positive exception are programs that mix improved job-search assistance and
tougher job-search monitoring such as the British New Deal for Young People (e.g. Blundell et al., 2004,
De Giorgi, 2005, Anderson, 2000, Van den Berg et al., 2004, and Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw, 2006).
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ically, the instrument Z now describes a discretization of calendar time, being 0 or 1 for
registration spells starting between August and December 1991 or 1992, respectively.24 As
before, the treatment consists of enrolling in YP as the rst activity after registration when
this occurs in the rst 3 or 6 months of the new spell. Estimation uses observations for
men aged 24 or younger at registration only, all satisfying the age-eligibility rule. Thus
eligibility is exactly dened by the instrument: eligibles (ineligibles) are those who register
in 1992 (1991). The treated are eligibles who move into YP before any other alternative in
the rst 3 or 6 months after registration. Sample sizes are presented in table 5.
Empirical evidence is not as favorable to the use of calendar time as it is to age. Relying
on older never-eligible individuals, we check Assumption 1 in the absence of treatment.
Table 6 displays the p-values of tests comparing means and distributions of older ineligibles
registering in 1991 and 1992. There is strong evidence that registration and employment
status 24 months after inow are markedly dierent by year of registration (rows 3 and
4). A comparison of employment rates reects the deteriorating macro conditions over this
period. The tests fail to reject the equality of means and distributions of deregistration
probabilities after 12 months of registration (rows 1 and 2, columns 2 and 4), but do not
support conditional independence of time variation and the probability of employment
(rows 1 and 2, columns 2 and 4). We proceed by focusing on 12 months' outcomes but
interpret any results with extreme care while noticing they serve illustrative purposes on
the use of a widely available instrument.
Table 7 shows the estimated eects and corrections. Matching yields negative and sig-
nicant eects of YP on deregistration and employment after 12 months of inow into
the spells of interest among 24 years old (row 1). The correction term is positive, sug-
gesting participants are drawn from a group with lower attachment to unemployment, but
non-signicant. It leads to a non-signicant corrected estimate. These results are more
pessimistic but broadly in line with those found using age as instrument.
Ineligibles face at least 6 additional months of pre-YP period after registration but are
24August 1991 is the rst month in Handel.
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then exposed to the possibility of enrolling into YP if still young enough.25 The latter is in
contrast with the conditions facing ineligibles as dened by the age instrument but does
not per se compromise the quality of calendar time as an instrument given our denition of
treatment. Nevertheless, we computed estimates for those at less than 6 months from their
25th birthday, who are never eligible if registering in 1991. Results are displayed in row 2
but the small number of observations precludes any statistically signicant conclusion to
be drawn.
Row 3 extends the analysis to all those aged 20 to 24 at registration. The pattern is now
better dened, suggesting that treatment may reduce the odds of employment (column 3)
and deregistration (column 6) by more than implied by standard matching (columns 1 and
4) due to selection of treated on unobserved characteristics (columns 2 and 5). However, the
feeble evidence supporting Assumption 1 cannot exclude the alternative interpretation that
time trends are driving the negative results. Restricting the comparison group in standard
matching to eligible non-treated individuals as in row 4 eliminates the time eects from the
estimates in columns 1 and 4 and may accentuate the correction in columns 2 and 5. Yet,
we nd only mild evidence of this pattern, with standard matching estimates being still
signicantly negative and correction terms being of similar order of magnitude as those in
row 3.
4 Conclusion
We have developed and applied an evaluation method for the eects of program participa-
tion (or policy exposure) on individual outcomes, if participation is selective but individuals
are ineligible in case of a certain value of some observed instrumental variable. From a prac-
tical point of view this is a common setting, in particular for active labor market policies
for young individuals. In those cases, participation may be selective because individuals
25Given the denition of treatment adopted here and the calendar time periods we propose to compare,
participation is possible among eligibles only.
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can choose between dierent programs and/or because the duration until enrollment is not
deterministically set. Program participation is only possible if the individual is aged be-
low a certain age. With selective participation, if the CIA is violated, matching cannot be
used. For the same reason, one cannot simply compare those below the threshold who are
treated to those above the threshold (who are all non-treated). However, our novel method,
which exploits the eligibility boundary restriction within the matching framework, provides
consistent estimates of the average treatment eect on those who are treated.
Our approach relies critically on the availability of an instrument satisfying Assump-
tions 1 and 2 in Section 2. Assumption 2 is automatically satised in our preferred practical
application of a policy that allows for selective participation only on certain values of an
observed variable. To obtain precise estimates of our correction term, however, we also
require the program to generate a reasonable number of participants to avoid dividing by
a number close to zero.
The application to the Swedish Youth Practice program shows that our method can
deliver evaluation results that dier from those based on standard matching methods. The
standard matching estimates for the eect on re-employment are zero, whereas the es-
timates based on our method can be strongly negative. Using our preferred instrument
age, the dierence between the estimates is systematically signicant when the outcome of
interest is \nding a job within 24 months of becoming unemployed". The eects on the
overall exit probabilities out of unemployment are invariably estimated to be smaller than
those based on matching, although the dierences here are not signicant. Our results con-
rm suspicions that treated dier systematically from comparable non-treated, suggesting
they are drawn from a more employable group. As a result, we are more pessimistic about
the eect of subsidized work on the rate of nding work than if we had incorrectly based
ourselves on the matching estimates, while overall exit rates from unemployment are less
negative (even possibly positive) than if we had relied on standard matching alone. The
latter exits mostly involve outows into formal education. From a policy point of view, our
results suggest that perhaps the optimism about the use of subsidized work programs to
34
bring unemployed youth back to work should be tempered.
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Appendix: Data cleaning and selection
Handel is an administrative dataset comprising information on all registered unemploy-
ment spells from August 1991 onwards. It details longitudinal information on the whole
population of registered spells, including any undertaken treatments, the history of earned
subsidies, destination on leaving the registrar and demographics such as age, citizenship,
education and usual occupation.
The main obstacle in using Handel is the frequency of negative and overlapping spells.
We have dealt with these occurrences in a conservative way to minimize any resulting bias
introduced by data handling.
To start with, we created a condensed variable describing labor market status while in
registrar. The four broad categories considered are: unemployment, registered employment,
YP, all other possible treatments. Using these, we collapsed all overlapping spells in the
same broad category. Spells in dierent broad categories overlapping by no more than 2
weeks were corrected by setting the exit date of the earliest equal to the entry date of the
latest as exit dates are generally more imprecise. Zero duration spells were discarded. At
last, individual histories with a remaining error were censored from the time of the error
onwards and a censoring indicator was created to correct estimates for the possibility of
censored histories.
Data selection followed a number of criteria. First, we used only males. Then we selected
individuals starting a new registered unemployment spell during the period YP was more
popular, between July 1992 and September 1994. Of all the selected spells, we kept only the
rst one and followed the corresponding individuals over time to nd out about treatment
take up and labor market outcomes. We considered individuals aged between 20 and 29 at
the time of registration and classied as eligibles those aged 24 or younger.
In running the estimation procedure, we also focused on more narrowly dened groups
as dened by the following variables: (i) Distance to 25th birthday at inow: less than 2
years, less than 1 year, between 12 and 4 months (this latter condition applies to eligibles
40
only, and compares with ineligbles less than 1 year away from 25th birthday at inow); (ii)
Nationality: Swedish nationals only or all new unemployed; (iii) Employment status at reg-
istration: whether or not registering as open unemployed; and (iv) Education attainment:
vocational training or all levels of education.
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Table 1: Number of observations by age group and eligibility/treatment status; instrument
is age; men only
ineligibles eligibles (under 25)
Distance to 25th (over 25) non-participants participants Total
birthday at inow (1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) up to 3 months 5,444 5,240 81 10,765
(2) up to 6 months 11,029 10,157 448 21,634
(3) up to 1 year 21,950 19,428 2,029 43,407
(4) up to 2 years 43,683 37,118 6,064 86,865
(5) up to 5 years 102,450 112,501 32,528 247,479
Notes: Population of males close to the 25th birthday when registering with the employment oce between
July 1992 and September 1994. Age groups dened by distance to 25th birthday when rst registering within
timeframe. Each individual is represented only once in the sample, whe rst registering. Eligibles (ineligibles)
are those aged 24 and below (25 and above) at registration. Participants are those taking YP as the rst
event after registration.
42
Figure 1: Hazard rates into YP by duration of unemployment spell and age at registration
with employment oce
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Notes: Plotted curves are smoothed Kaplan Meyer hazard rates using Local Linear
Regression with a bandwidth of 15 days. Population of males aged 24 when registering
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rst time between July 1992 and September 1994.
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Figure 2: Probability of participation by age at inow into new registered unemployment
spell; men only
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Notes: Population of males aged 22 to 26 when registering with the employment
oce for the rst time between July 1992 and September 1994. `Participation' means
owing into YP as rst event after registration.
Figure 3: Probability density functions for propensity scores; instrument is age
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Notes: Plotted curves are probability density functions of propensity scores estimated on the population of men aged 24 and
25 when registering with the employment oce between July 1992 and September 1994. Treated are 24 years old moving
into YP as rst destination within 6 months of inow. Non-treated are 24 and 25 years old not participating in YP as 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Table 2: P-values for tests of Assumption 1; instrument is age
equality of means equality of distribution
deregistration employment deregistration employment observ.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outows after 10 months of registration for spells starting during Aug 1991
Comparing men aged 24 or younger with men aged 25 or older at registration
(1) 24 versus 25 0.082 0.814 0.990 0.605 3,959
(2) 24:7-12 vs 25:1-6 0.826 0.516 0.938 0.843 1,928
(3) 24:1-8 vs 25 0.100 0.898 0.591 0.266 3,323
(4) 23-24 vs 25-26 0.091 0.910 0.948 0.988 7,913
Outows after 24 months of registration for spells starting during YP period
Comparing men aged close to 25 or 26 at registration
(5) 25 versus 26 0.264 0.289 0.385 0.811 27,625
(6) 25:7-12 vs 26:1-6 0.138 0.904 0.961 0.401 13,921
(7) 25-26 vs 27-28 0.739 0.927 0.071 0.996 54,458
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 display the p-values for the dierence in means. Columns 3 and 4 display the p-values for the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distributions. Rows 1 to 4 use registration spells starting in August 1991 and follows
them for 10 month, till just before the launch of YP. Rows 5 to 7 use registration spells of older individuals during the YP
period. Bootstrapped standard errors using 200 replications.
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Table 3: ATT on the outows to regular employment
Outcome: employment
12 months after registration 24 months after registration
classical correction adjusted classical correction adjusted nr of
matching term matching matching term matching observ.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treated: 24 years old moving into YP within 6 months of registration
Controls: ineligibles (25 years old) and eligible (24 years old) non-treated
(1) -0.009 -0.015 0.006 -0.008 0.096* -0.104* 1,699
(0.011) (0.045) (0.047) (0.012) (0.048) (0.050)
Treated: 24 years old moving into YP within 6 months of registration - open unemployed
Controls: ineligibles (25 years old) and eligible (24 years old) non-treated - open unemployed
(2) -0.012 -0.022 0.010 -0.010 0.100* -0.109* 1,606
(0.011) (0.045) (0.048) (0.013) (0.050) (0.051)
Treated: 24:1 to 24:8 years old moving into YP within 6 months of registration
Controls: ineligibles (25 years old) and eligible (24:1 to 24:8 years old) non-treated
(3) -0.011 -0.002 -0.008 -0.004 0.070* -0.073* 1,579
(0.012) (0.036) (0.038) (0.014) (0.035) (0.036)
Treated: 24 years old moving into YP within 6 months of registration
Controls: eligible (24 years old) non-treated
(4) -0.015 -0.041 0.026 -0.007 0.042 -0.049 1,563
(0.013) (0.048) (0.047) (0.014) (0.052) (0.051)
Treated: 24 years old moving into YP within 3 months of registration
Controls: ineligibles (25 years old) and eligible (24 years old) non-treated
(5) 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.154* -0.150* 1,049
(0.014) (0.070) (0.071) (0.017) (0.075) (0.075)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis below the estimate.
* : Statistically dierent from zero at 5% signicance level. See footnote 19 for additional explanations.
46
Table 4: ATT on outows to employment and deregistration within 24 months of registra-
tion
Outcome: employment Outcome: deregistration
classical correction adjusted classical correction adjusted nr of
matching term matching matching term matching observ.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treated: 24 years old moving into YP within 6 months of registration
Controls: ineligibles (25 years old) and eligible (24 years old) non-treated
(1) -0.008 0.096* -0.104* -0.032* -0.075 0.043 1,699
(0.012) (0.048) (0.050) (0.012) (0.049) (0.051)
Treated: 23-24 years old moving into YP within 6 months of registration
Controls: ineligibles (25-26 years old) and eligible (23-24 years old) non-treated
(2) 0.006 0.082* -0.076* -0.031* -0.151* 0.120* 4,468
(0.008) (0.028) (0.028) (0.008) (0.030) (0.030)
Treated: 24:7 to 24:12 years old moving into YP within 6 months of registration
Controls: ineligibles (25:1 to 25:6 years old) and eligible (24:7 to 24:12 years old) non-treated
(3) -0.001 0.187 -0.188 -0.011 0.098 -0.109 401
(0.026) (0.152) (0.154) (0.026) (0.147) (0.150)
Notes: Estimates for males only. Sample selection criteria varies by row as detailed in row titles. All estimates based
on sample of new registrations with the employment oce. \Treatment" stands for owing into YP within 6 months of
registering with employment oce as rst destination after registration. Row 1 compares treated aged 24 at registration
with non-treated aged 24 or 25 at registration. Row 2 uses the sample of individuals at less than 2 years from 25th birthday
on registration. Row 3 uses only individuals at less than 6 months from their 25th birthday at registration. The impact of
treatment is estimated on the probability of moving into employment within 24 months (columns 1 to 3) and deregistering
within 24 months (columns 4 to 6) of inow. Columns 1 and 4 display standard matching estimates. Columns 2 and 5 display
the correction term as specied in the right-hand side of equation (4). Columns 3 and 6 display the corrected matching
estimates using the counterfactuals as specied in equation (4). Matching on the propensity score using kernel Epanechnikov
weights with a bandwidth of 0.02 for a probability ranging in the unit interval. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 200
replications in brackets below the estimate.
* Statistically dierent from zero at 5% signicance level.
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Table 5: Number of observations by age group and eligibility/treatment status; instrument
is calendar time; men only
ineligibles eligibles (1992 inow)
Age at (1991 inow) non-participants participants Total
registration (1) (2) (3) (4)
registration period: Aug-Dec
(1) age: 20-24 44,508 33,631 9,376 87,515
(2) age: 24 7,743 6,410 820 14,973
(3) age: 24:7-12 3,857 3,345 189 7,391
Notes: Population of males younger than 25 when registering with the employment oce during August to
December 1991 or 1992. Each individual is represented at most once in each period (pre- and post-YP, 1991
and 1992 respectively). Eligibles (ineligibles) are registering in 1992 (1991) and participants are eligibles who
ow into YP as the rst event after registration.
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Table 6: P-values for tests of Assumption 1 on older ineligibles - instrument is calendar
time
equality of means equality of distribution
employment deregistration employment deregistration nr observ.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outows after 12 months of registration for older ineligible men
Comparing registration spells starting in 1992:8-12 and 1991:8-12
(1) 25 to 29 years old 0.031 0.112 0.058 0.132 3,959
(2) 25 years old 0.040 0.711 0.071 0.479 1,928
Outows after 24 months of registration for older ineligible men
Comparing registration spells starting in 1992:8-12 and 1991:8-12
(3) 25 to 29 years old 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 3,323
(4) 25 years old 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 7,913
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 display the p-values for the dierence in means. Columns 3 and 4 display the p-values for the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distributions. Rows 1 and 2 (3 and 4) describe eects on employment and registration
status 12 (24) months after registration. Bootstrapped standard errors using 200 replications.
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Table 7: ATT on employment and deregistration probabilities 12 months after registration
Outcome: employment Outcome: deregistration
classical correction adjusted classical correction adjusted nr of
matching term matching matching term matching observ.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treated: 24 years old registering in 1992:8-12, YP in rst 6 months
Controls: ineligibles (registration 1991:8-12) and eligible (registration 1992:8-12) non-treated
(1) -0.057* 0.069 -0.127 -0.080* 0.049 -0.129 765
(0.020) (0.100) (0.101) (0.024) (0.103) (0.105)
Treated: 24:7-12 years old registering in 1992:8-12, YP in rst 6 months
Controls: ineligibles (registration 1991:8-12) and eligible (registration 1992:8-12) non-treated
(2) -0.021 0.100 -0.131 -0.033 -0.270 0.237 171
(0.035) (0.223) (0.229) (0.039) (0.211) (0.214)
Treated: 20-24 years old registering in 1992:8-12, YP in rst 6 months
Controls: ineligibles (registration 1991:8-12) and eligible (registration 1992:8-12) non-treated
(3) -0.035* 0.078* -0.112* -0.065* 0.155* -0.220* 8,972
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.024) (0.024)
Treated: 20-24 years old registering in 1992:8-12, YP in rst 6 months
Controls: eligible (registration 1992:8-12) non-treated
(4) -0.015* 0.118* -0.133* -0.044* 0.177* -0.223* 8,972
(0.007) (0.026) (0.026) (0.008) (0.025) (0.024)
Notes: Estimates for males only. All estimates based on sample of new registrations with the employment oce during
1992:8-12 and 1991:8-12. \Treatment" stands for owing into YP within 6 months of registering with employment oce as
rst destination after registration. Row 1 uses observations on 24 years old at registration. Row 2 further restricts sample
to men at least 6 months into their 24th year. Row 3 extends the sample to all those aged 20 to 24 and row 4 restricts
the control group used in standard atching to includ eligible non-treated only. The impact of treatment is estimated on the
probability of employment (columns 1 to 3) or deregistering (columns 4 to 6) 12 months after registration. Details on the
contents of each colmn are identical to those of table 3 and can be found in footnote 19.
* Statistically dierent from zero at 5% signicance level.
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